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FORCED DECRYPTION AS EQUILIBRIUM— 
WHY IT’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND HOW RILEY 
MATTERS 
Dan Terzian* 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seeks equilibrium.1 When new 
technology frustrates the government’s ability to obtain evidence, “the 
Supreme Court generally adopts lower Fourth Amendment 
protections . . . to help restore the status quo ante level of government 
power.”2 Conversely, when new technology “makes evidence substantially 
easier for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court often embraces 
higher protections to help restore the prior level of privacy protection.”3 
One need not search far back to find equilibrium-seeking in action—see 
Riley v. California,4 a Supreme Court decision of just this past term on the 
Fourth Amendment and cellphones. 
 Yet equilibrium-seeking is not confined to that Amendment. In the 
Fifth Amendment, too, the Court seeks equilibrium. Throughout Self-
Incrimination Clause jurisprudence, one finds the Court balancing privacy 
against the government’s need to obtain evidence.5 
  Enter: encrypted data and the compelled production thereof, an 
area in want of equilibrium. Previously, when the government obtained a 
warrant for data, it got that data. But now when the sought data is 
encrypted, the government instead gets a password prompt. If that password 
is strong, the computer is, in Riley’s words, “all but ‘unbreakable.’”6 This 
leaves the government with just one option: obtaining a subpoena to force 
the person to enter her password and thereby decrypt the data. But does the 
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause bar this forced decryption? 
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 Lower courts have not yet sought, nor even considered, 
equilibrium in answering this question.7 The only federal appeals court 
ruling on the issue essentially held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
forced decryption.8 There goes the government’s ability to obtain digital 
evidence in that circuit. 
 This is a mistake. Courts should begin seeking equilibrium in their 
Fifth Amendment analyses. Riley itself, even though a Fourth Amendment 
case, signals courts to do so. The Riley Court sought equilibrium, and its 
decision tells lower courts to do similarly, to “feel free to read Supreme 
Court precedents narrowly” in other cases involving new technologies.9 
Encryption is such a new technology: It vitiates the government’s ability to 
gather evidence. Paper documents—even if locked in a safe—can be 
recovered;10 an encrypted computer’s documents cannot. Maintaining 
equilibrium here requires permitting forced decryption, and Self-
Incrimination Clause precedent can be interpreted as permitting it. Courts 
should therefore adopt that interpretation. 
  This Essay first introduces Self-Incrimination Clause doctrine 
apart from any equilibrium analysis (Part I); then discusses Riley and its 
equilibrium-seeking (Part II); and last argues that Riley supports finding 
forced decryption constitutional (Part III). 
I. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE 
The Self-Incrimination Clause declares that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”11 The 
privilege against self-incrimination, where applicable, gives persons the 
right to refuse the government’s demands for information, data, or objects.12 
The privilege applies wherever the government (1) compels (2) a 
testimonial communication or act that (3) is incriminating.13 In practice, the 
analysis focuses only on the element of testimonial communications or acts, 
because the other two’s existence or nonexistence is “obvious.”14 
Communications or acts can be testimonial for two independent 
reasons: because they convey an implied communication or because they 
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require substantial mental effort. Implied communications arise from 
producing documents. If you, say, produce files from a specific computer, 
you’re implying that you possess or control that computer.15 This 
production can be testimonial and therefore barred by the Fifth 
Amendment.16 
Implied communications pose no real concern to forced decryption’s 
constitutionality for two reasons. First, the government can compel the 
production if it provides act of production immunity. This “immuniz[es] the 
testimonial component of the act”—the government cannot use it to prove 
ownership—but lets the government use the data obtained from the 
computer to prove anything else.17 
Second, the government may be able to compel production through the 
“foregone conclusion” exception. Where the government can 
“independently confirm” the testimonial component (here, computer 
ownership) through specific “prior knowledge” that goes beyond mere 
suspicion, it can still compel production.18 So when the government finds a 
desktop computer in Winston’s unshared studio apartment, that computer’s 
password prompt lists the user as “Winston,” and the only fingerprints on 
the computer are Winston’s, his ownership is likely a foregone conclusion 
and the files’ production can be compelled.19 
Contrast implied communications with the stronger reason why forced 
decryption could be viewed as testimonial: through substantial mental 
effort. Compelled acts requiring substantial mental effort are testimonial, 
while those requiring little are not.20 Note that the foregone conclusion 
exception applies here too—if the government seeks a specific document 
and knows it’s on your computer, the exception applies regardless of the 
mental effort involved.21 
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Consider the following examples of testimonial communications 
through mental effort. Producing handwriting or voice samples requires 
relatively little mental effort—just, basically, commanding yourself to write 
or speak—so compelling their production is not testimonial and thus is 
permissible.22 But responding to a subpoena seeking documents spanning 
eleven broad categories and amounting to over 13,000 responsive pages? 
That requires substantial mental effort and is therefore testimonial.23 
Now, which example do you think forced decryption (compelling a 
person to enter a password) is more like: writing some words or mining box 
after box for responsive documents? Me too. This is how current doctrine 
can be interpreted as permitting forced decryption. 
To be sure, this interpretation is more nuanced at the margins. Maybe, 
for instance, Julia does not remember her password and learning it requires 
finding its various components stowed in numerous boxes. Even here, 
though, forced decryption still does not require substantial mental effort. 
Julia does not need to analyze a subpoena and make judgments about 
whether certain documents are responsive.24 Rather, she knows exactly what 
she needs to do—physically compile the password’s components and then 
decrypt her computer—with no judgments being necessary. 
Courts have not yet framed the issue this way.25 The Eleventh Circuit, 
the only federal appeals court deciding it, found forced decryption 
testimonial.26 Its analysis hinged on a line of Supreme Court dicta: the 
production of strongbox keys can be compelled, but combinations to a safe 
cannot.27 Because computer passwords are more like combinations than 
keys, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a password’s production is 
testimonial.28 It then concluded that forced decryption is also testimonial 
because using a decryption password requires substantial mental effort, as 
it’s also more like producing a combination than a key.29 
This reasoning falters twice. First, it misreads Supreme Court dicta. 
The dicta regards only compelling production: The government can compel 
the production of keys but not the production of combinations.30 It’s silent 
on whether the government can compel unlocking (i.e., forcing a person to 
enter a combination without producing a copy). This silence, coupled with 
the dicta’s rationale, suggests that compelled unlocking may be 
constitutional. The reason for the Court distinguishing between key- and 
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combination- productions stems from the Court’s concern over compelled 
creation. Combinations may not exist outside a person’s mind, so producing 
them would require compelling the creation of a physical version, and it is 
this compelled creation that makes the response testimonial.31 There are no 
such compelled creation concerns with compelled unlocking through forced 
decryption—the data is already there, the person just needs to unlock it; and 
unlocking it does not require creating a physical copy of the password.  
The second stumble comes in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of mental 
effort. Entering an oft-used password requires no more mental effort than 
finding a key.32 You remember the key’s location and then find it, just as 
you remember the password and then input it. 
Put aside the relative merits of these competing interpretations, mine 
and the Eleventh Circuit’s; they matter little here. Instead, just accept that 
the interpretation permitting forced decryption is theoretically possible 
under current Fifth Amendment doctrine, even if you think it improbable. 
Here’s why lower courts should nevertheless adopt the improbable 
interpretation and permit forced decryption: Riley v. California. 
II.  EQUILIBRIUM-SEEKING IN RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
To start, Riley is not a Fifth Amendment case. It’s a Fourth 
Amendment one, raising the question of whether the government can search 
a person’s cellphone incident to arrest. The answer: Not without a warrant.33 
That answer’s not terribly important for forced decryption cases. What 
is important, however, are two principles Riley articulates that apply 
broadly to criminal procedure jurisprudence. But before discussing those 
principles, let me allay any initial concerns: It matters not that Riley regards 
the Fourth Amendment and forced decryption regards the Fifth. In both 
areas, “the Court zigs, zags, and balances, ad hoc” in an attempt to seek 
equilibrium.34 Moreover, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that “[t]he 
values protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . substantially overlap [with] 
those . . . [that] the Fifth Amendment helps to protect.”35 Because Riley 
essentially regards computers and touches upon encryption’s 
impenetrability, that overlap is twofold here. 
Now on to Riley’s two core principles. First, Riley thrice signals that 
there should be computer-rules of criminal procedure, just as there are 
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vehicle-rules.36 First by declaring that many cellphones “are in fact 
minicomputers;”37 second by distinguishing these minicomputers from other 
objects kept on the person;38 and third by declaring that searching 
minicomputers cannot be analogized to other searches incident to arrest.39 
On distinguishing computers, the Court recognized that cellphones are 
“qualitatively different” from other objects people carry.40 The details they 
contain about “the privacies of life” are so vast that they “implicate privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a 
wallet, or a purse.”41 And as for not analogizing computer searches to other 
contexts, the Court declined to “import[ ] [constitutional standards] from 
the vehicle context” to cellphones.42 It then also rejected “an analogue test” 
that would allow the government to search photos on a cellphone just as it 
could search photos in a wallet.43 
Riley’s second notable contribution is how it determines the cellphone-
search rule: by seeking equilibrium. Though this equilibrium-seeking is not 
explicit, it is nevertheless apparent.44 The Court noted that people carried 
relatively little personal information on their person before cellphones 
existed, so searches incident to arrest did not give the government much 
evidence.45 Cellphones changed this. They contain immense amounts of 
“quantitative and . . . qualitative data” about a person’s life,46 which make 
an arrestee’s privacy interest in her cellphone “dwarf those in [her other 
personal property at hand].”47 Moreover, allowing cellphones to be searched 
would make it too easy for the government to obtain evidence, because such 
searches “would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house.”48 At bottom, the Court’s forbidding 
cellphone searches incident to arrest maintained equilibrium by providing 
higher protections for cellphones than for other objects, to help restore the 
prior level of privacy protection. 
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III. FORCED DECRYPTION AS EQUILIBRIUM 
 Riley’s two principles illuminate the forced decryption issue. The 
repeated assertions that computers are different—suggesting there should be 
computer-specific criminal procedure rules—send a flare to lower courts: 
Don’t “too quickly follow broad statements from pre-digital opinions, even 
if those opinions emanated from the Supreme Court itself.”49 Instead, courts 
should “feel free to read Supreme Court precedents narrowly” in the context 
of criminal procedure and new technologies.50 Just as Riley rejected an 
analogue test to determine the constitutionality of cellphone searches, lower 
courts should reject the same test to determine whether forced decryption is 
constitutional. They need not inquire whether forcing Julia to decrypt her 
hard drive is more like producing a safe combination than a strongbox key. 
So even if the supposedly better interpretation of pre-digital Fifth 
Amendment doctrine is that forced decryption is forbidden, lower courts 
should instead—if there’s good reason to—adopt the possible interpretation 
that forced decryption is permissible. And that good reason, Riley tells us, is 
maintaining equilibrium. 
 This is why courts should allow forced decryption: to maintain the 
equilibrium between individual privacy and government power that Riley 
also seeks to balance. Prior to encryption, the government obtained a 
warrant and got the sought data. Even if the sought documents were held in 
a safe and the government lacked the combination, the government still 
obtained them because it could crack the safe.51 
 Also note that the government has a right to this data once it 
obtains a warrant. As Riley recognized, the “answer to the question of what 
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is 
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”52 Once the government obtains that 
warrant—once it has probable cause to believe the cellphone contains 
evidence that “will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction” for a 
particular offense—privacy concerns cease, and the government has the 
right search it.53 If the cellphone is unencrypted, the government then 
obtains the data pursuant to that warrant. 
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 But if the data lies on an encrypted device, equilibrium is 
disrupted. Encryption can be virtually unbreakable, so the government 
cannot obtain readable data without forced decryption. Even though the 
government has the right to obtain this data with a warrant. Even though it 
would obtain this data if it were not encrypted. And even though all data, 
encrypted or not, is increasingly essential evidence.54 In short, encryption 
transforms the government’s right to obtain this evidence into a person’s 
right to essentially destroy evidence by making it inaccessible, a right 
fundamentally counter to established jurisprudence.55 The only way to 
restore the status quo—to return the government’s ability to obtain evidence 
to its ex ante level—is through finding forced decryption constitutional. 
 How, exactly, courts go about restoring equilibrium is a question 
of line-drawing. Courts could say that forced decryption is always 
constitutional because it’s a nontestimonial act and that’s all that matters. 
Or they could find that forced decryption is just sometimes constitutional, 
only where maintaining equilibrium actually requires it. So if the 
government cannot at all obtain the data without forced decryption, it’s 
constitutional; but if the government can easily obtain it (say by getting the 
password from the person’s spouse), forced decryption is not constitutional. 
Elsewhere I’ve suggested a slight preference for the circumstantial 
approach.56 But the absolute approach—that forced decryption is always 
constitutional—has merit as well. Chiefly, it’s easier in application, and 
Riley rejects a circumstantial test in favor of an absolute ban on cellphone 
searches incident to arrest.57 Wherever the line, it will likely be determined 
just as it was in Riley: by the Supreme Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence seeks 
equilibrium, and Riley calls for lower courts to seek it as well. Courts 
interpreting the Fifth Amendment and whether it permits forced decryption 
should therefore consider equilibrium. Permitting forced decryption 
maintains the status quo; forbidding forced decryption destroys it. Because 
Fifth Amendment doctrine can be interpreted as allowing forced decryption 
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